I would suggest that the farcical operational record of the RCN's current submarine fleet (flooding, bottom strikes, generator overloads ...) is primarily due to a history of submarine service that has been intermittent and just too small. We have failed to maintain the necessary cadre of expertise over the decades. That is to say, the primary "Continuous Capability" we ought to be "Sustaining" is the capability to maintain and operate actual boats. That implies we ought to have initiated this procurement process a decade ago; since we failed to do that, we have backed ourselves into a corner where the only really relevant consideration is the delivery schedule of the new boats. We've nobody to blame for that but ourselves.
From a more general perspective, repairing our absurdly dysfunctional procurement process has to start with the recognition that these projects, as expensive as they may be, are still primarily weapons that serve a military purpose, and only incidentally pork. We have been inverting these priorities too long. It's even a fallacy on its own terms! The "sail away" cost of frigates and submarines is only a minority of the total cost of operating them; most of the balance will inevitably be spent domestically anyway.
Can someone explain why the challenges described by the process that DND is now commencing - interoperability with our allies, the desire to have more compatible weapons systems on the vessels, and the issues related to having the human infrastructure for sustainment after delivery - are not better solved by saying “me too” to the submarine acquisition aspect of AUKUS? What is the problem with joining that solution? Plus, As a question of political economy, nothing would telegraph a clearer message that Canada was serious about reversing its atrocious track-record on defence, than to get with the AUKUS program, if we are permitted to join? Or is the problem that the answer would be “no” ...?
Even if there was a strong desire for nuclear submarines from government, there is no production capacity available for AUKUS to produce more submarines for the RCN. The Australians are't expecting delivery of their first AUKUS until the 2040s (they are getting 3 American Virginias as an interim submarine) and we'd be after the Aussies in the queue. We'd be looking at a ~10 year gap with no submarines in service if we went that route; then we'd lose a substantial amount of experience and institutional knowledge on operating and maintaining submarines. Not to meantion learning, for the first time, how to operate nuclear boats. And we won't have the Virginia option either: American shipyards are maxed with the submarines orders from the USN and RAN.
So you can have 8-12 conventional submarines with delivery starting in 2035, or 4-6 (speculating, but they'll be a lot more expensive so fewer would be procured) nuclear submarines with a 2045-2050 delivery timeline. (And a 10-15 year gap with no submarines in the latter option)
There is no chance, literally zero, that Canada would ever sign on to a *nuclear* submarine agreement. The antinuclear constituency is far, far too strong in this country and it could never be sold to a defence illiterate public. The price is astronomical and there are doubts about Australia’s ability to sustain this project. Politically, it would be dead in the water (pun intended).
I would suggest that the farcical operational record of the RCN's current submarine fleet (flooding, bottom strikes, generator overloads ...) is primarily due to a history of submarine service that has been intermittent and just too small. We have failed to maintain the necessary cadre of expertise over the decades. That is to say, the primary "Continuous Capability" we ought to be "Sustaining" is the capability to maintain and operate actual boats. That implies we ought to have initiated this procurement process a decade ago; since we failed to do that, we have backed ourselves into a corner where the only really relevant consideration is the delivery schedule of the new boats. We've nobody to blame for that but ourselves.
From a more general perspective, repairing our absurdly dysfunctional procurement process has to start with the recognition that these projects, as expensive as they may be, are still primarily weapons that serve a military purpose, and only incidentally pork. We have been inverting these priorities too long. It's even a fallacy on its own terms! The "sail away" cost of frigates and submarines is only a minority of the total cost of operating them; most of the balance will inevitably be spent domestically anyway.
Can someone explain why the challenges described by the process that DND is now commencing - interoperability with our allies, the desire to have more compatible weapons systems on the vessels, and the issues related to having the human infrastructure for sustainment after delivery - are not better solved by saying “me too” to the submarine acquisition aspect of AUKUS? What is the problem with joining that solution? Plus, As a question of political economy, nothing would telegraph a clearer message that Canada was serious about reversing its atrocious track-record on defence, than to get with the AUKUS program, if we are permitted to join? Or is the problem that the answer would be “no” ...?
Even if there was a strong desire for nuclear submarines from government, there is no production capacity available for AUKUS to produce more submarines for the RCN. The Australians are't expecting delivery of their first AUKUS until the 2040s (they are getting 3 American Virginias as an interim submarine) and we'd be after the Aussies in the queue. We'd be looking at a ~10 year gap with no submarines in service if we went that route; then we'd lose a substantial amount of experience and institutional knowledge on operating and maintaining submarines. Not to meantion learning, for the first time, how to operate nuclear boats. And we won't have the Virginia option either: American shipyards are maxed with the submarines orders from the USN and RAN.
So you can have 8-12 conventional submarines with delivery starting in 2035, or 4-6 (speculating, but they'll be a lot more expensive so fewer would be procured) nuclear submarines with a 2045-2050 delivery timeline. (And a 10-15 year gap with no submarines in the latter option)
There is no chance, literally zero, that Canada would ever sign on to a *nuclear* submarine agreement. The antinuclear constituency is far, far too strong in this country and it could never be sold to a defence illiterate public. The price is astronomical and there are doubts about Australia’s ability to sustain this project. Politically, it would be dead in the water (pun intended).