I would suggest that the farcical operational record of the RCN's current submarine fleet (flooding, bottom strikes, generator overloads ...) is primarily due to a history of submarine service that has been intermittent and just too small. We have failed to maintain the necessary cadre of expertise over the decades. That is to say, the primary "Continuous Capability" we ought to be "Sustaining" is the capability to maintain and operate actual boats. That implies we ought to have initiated this procurement process a decade ago; since we failed to do that, we have backed ourselves into a corner where the only really relevant consideration is the delivery schedule of the new boats. We've nobody to blame for that but ourselves.
From a more general perspective, repairing our absurdly dysfunctional procurement process has to start with the recognition that these projects, as expensive as they may be, are still primarily weapons that serve a military purpose, and only incidentally pork. We have been inverting these priorities too long. It's even a fallacy on its own terms! The "sail away" cost of frigates and submarines is only a minority of the total cost of operating them; most of the balance will inevitably be spent domestically anyway.
I would suggest that the farcical operational record of the RCN's current submarine fleet (flooding, bottom strikes, generator overloads ...) is primarily due to a history of submarine service that has been intermittent and just too small. We have failed to maintain the necessary cadre of expertise over the decades. That is to say, the primary "Continuous Capability" we ought to be "Sustaining" is the capability to maintain and operate actual boats. That implies we ought to have initiated this procurement process a decade ago; since we failed to do that, we have backed ourselves into a corner where the only really relevant consideration is the delivery schedule of the new boats. We've nobody to blame for that but ourselves.
From a more general perspective, repairing our absurdly dysfunctional procurement process has to start with the recognition that these projects, as expensive as they may be, are still primarily weapons that serve a military purpose, and only incidentally pork. We have been inverting these priorities too long. It's even a fallacy on its own terms! The "sail away" cost of frigates and submarines is only a minority of the total cost of operating them; most of the balance will inevitably be spent domestically anyway.