Submarines and Smarter Procurement
Buying an ‘off the shelf’ submarine makes sense. Let’s hope Ottawa has the discipline to do it fast.
Canada released a request for information (RFI) for the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) last week. A RFI isn’t usually big news; they’re issued all the time. In this case, it’s worth writing about, since CPSP is looking like a test case for an improved approach to procurement.
To start, it’s important to note that the CPSP RFI was issued earlier than most commentators might have expected. When the government released its long-awaited defence policy update in April 2024, Our North, Strong and Free, the submarine replacement was only exploratory. Leading up to this past summer’s NATO summit, however, the Trudeau government realized that it needed big announcements to appease allies who are increasingly impatient with Canadian defence spending. CPSP fit the bill, helping Trudeau pledge that Canada would reach the 2% of GDP target by 2032.
Now, CPSP hasn’t been given a price tag yet. This may lead critics to think that the project isn’t actually going anywhere. Until there’s funding, CPSP is unlikely to make much progress, the thinking goes. But there’s another, more positive way of interpreting what’s happening. Rather than coming up with a rough order of magnitude costing based on open sources, the government wants to hear from submarine builders before it settles on a number. Progress! Annex B of the RFI specifically asks potential bidders how much their boats cost per unit and how that varies if Canada buys 8 or 12. The answers will be sugar-coated and unrealistic, but at least they’ll provide a floor to build on.
The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is hoping to get new submarines relatively quickly. Canada’s Victoria-class submarines need to be replaced as soon as possible, otherwise the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) risks losing the ability to train submariners and maintain this capability. There are a few stopgap measures available, such as training with allies, but they can’t be relied upon for an extended period. If CPSP isn’t completed in due time, Canada may be out of the submarine business. To that end, the RFI is asking bidders whether they can deliver a first boat by 2035 or earlier if possible. As anyone who follows defence procurement closely knows, a project of this size usually takes around 15 years to complete, so 2035 represents an accelerated timeline based on past experiences. CPSP therefore presents an opportunity for defence and other departments to show that a faster approach is possible.
This is where CPSP gets interesting. To get a first boat by 2035, the RCN recognizes that it may need to acquire a largely unmodified design. The RCN is hoping to stick as closely to Military Off the Shelf (MOTS) as it can. That’s not an easy feat. It may mean accepting another country’s safety standards. It may involve using combat systems that don’t operate the same munitions that Canada knows and stocks. In turn, it may mean having to acquire another type of torpedo or land attack missile that differs from what the rest of the CAF uses. That may not sound like a big deal, but the associated costs and risks of new combat systems may be significant. Still, the RCN is willing to accept these trade-offs if it means getting a new submarine before the existing ones reach their end of life.
The question, of course, is whether the RCN will be able to convince the rest of Ottawa to stick with this MOTS plan. We probably won’t know until the request for proposals (RFP) is published, though I suspect that there will be strong opposition from various corners. As we’ve seen with the Canadian Surface Combatant, the temptation to modify existing designs is strong, and in this case, that will be reinforced by various considerations, such as safety, an emphasis on common systems, and concerns about interoperability, interchangeability, and jointness. As well, the RFI itself asks a bunch of questions about how Canadian industry and Canadian technology could be included in bids, which is in tension with the MOTS emphasis. Luckily, the RFI basically acknowledges this trade-off and seems to invite bidders to give the government a reality check.[1]
The High-Level Mandatory Requirements (HLMRs) listed in the RFI give the RCN ways to assuage some of these concerns. An explanation for HLMR 15 (Upgradeability and Growth Potential) states that the new submarine must be prepared for “rapid technical insertion through Continuous Capability Sustainment.” This means that the boats will be able to take on new systems after they’ve been delivered. Indeed, the same HLMR explanation provides that the submarines “must also have the growth potential to integrate new systems and payloads.” So, the new submarines may not have everything the CAF wants or needs when acquired, yet they’ll be able to incorporate them after they come into service.
Another potential concern is the fuzziness on design maturity. To qualify for one-on-one meetings after the RFIs are returned, bidders must meet one of three criteria: the submarine they’re offering must be in production; the submarine they’re offering must be in service; or they must be able to deliver a first submarine to Canada by 2035. This last one is risky. Since the CPSP contract is meant to be awarded in 2028, certain bidders may make promises they can’t keep about a design that isn’t yet in production. While this leaves Canada’s options open and allows for a larger number of bidders, it seems to go against the underlying effort to acquire a mature MOTS boat quickly. It’ll be interesting to see if these criteria remain as loose during the actual competition.
Overall, the RFI is a promising start. Senior officials and military leaders look like they have a good sense of how CPSP needs to run if Canada is serious about getting new boats in short order. Let’s hope it stays that way.
[1] Notably, these questions seem designed to get a lukewarm answer: “What Canadian technology could be integrated into the CPS while keeping the same or better cost, delivery schedule and capability as a MOTS submarine? Can Canadian technology be integrated into the CPS and the delivery of the first CPS occur no later than 2035?”
I would suggest that the farcical operational record of the RCN's current submarine fleet (flooding, bottom strikes, generator overloads ...) is primarily due to a history of submarine service that has been intermittent and just too small. We have failed to maintain the necessary cadre of expertise over the decades. That is to say, the primary "Continuous Capability" we ought to be "Sustaining" is the capability to maintain and operate actual boats. That implies we ought to have initiated this procurement process a decade ago; since we failed to do that, we have backed ourselves into a corner where the only really relevant consideration is the delivery schedule of the new boats. We've nobody to blame for that but ourselves.
From a more general perspective, repairing our absurdly dysfunctional procurement process has to start with the recognition that these projects, as expensive as they may be, are still primarily weapons that serve a military purpose, and only incidentally pork. We have been inverting these priorities too long. It's even a fallacy on its own terms! The "sail away" cost of frigates and submarines is only a minority of the total cost of operating them; most of the balance will inevitably be spent domestically anyway.
Can someone explain why the challenges described by the process that DND is now commencing - interoperability with our allies, the desire to have more compatible weapons systems on the vessels, and the issues related to having the human infrastructure for sustainment after delivery - are not better solved by saying “me too” to the submarine acquisition aspect of AUKUS? What is the problem with joining that solution? Plus, As a question of political economy, nothing would telegraph a clearer message that Canada was serious about reversing its atrocious track-record on defence, than to get with the AUKUS program, if we are permitted to join? Or is the problem that the answer would be “no” ...?