Thank you for the typically excellent article, but I would question whether you address the headline notion of the government aspirations. Admittedly there can be a somewhat fluid definition of what exactly defines an aspiration in this context.
Beyond the strictly generic policy goals of “defending Canadian sovereignty”, “meeting international obligations”, etc., should we not look for specific targets in terms of capabilities, availabilities, domestic sourcing, maximum non-Canadian sourcing, domestic ability to supply/compete and so on.
Apologies if I’ve missed some of these in the announcement and maybe I’m too interested in the very nerdy number targets (planes, tanks, ships, etc.) but given the massive amount of money about to be spent, shouldn’t we have some hard targets?
We should look for specific platforms, systems, and capabilities, but not exactly from this type of announcement. Cabinet and the PM set the mission and the funding (this announcement) now the CAF and procurement/DND civil service go shopping.
Ideally, we don't want cabinet picking and chosing specific systems. They might broadly pick a capability (ie tanker aircraft) but it would be up to the CAF and PSPC to pick the system and quantity.
There are more than 50 capital acquisition projects for the CAF at various stages (some funded to actually buy equipment, but most funded just to do the administrative procurement work). PSPC and the CAF will go back to cabinet and say "with this addition funding, we'd like purchase x, y, and z funded". Then the specific requirements and quanties are announced for the defense industry to bid on.
Sorry if I was unclear. I did not expect an announcement including specific systems or platforms - as cool as that would be. I merely wanted to say that I did not think the announcement included (as the headline suggests) the new aspirations of the government, other than possibly meeting the spending target earlier.
I completely agree that the politicians should not be selecting systems, although the current debate over the F-35 is testing this, and possibly for good reason.
Not there yet. Expect a progressive elaboration - as details get worked out, problems getter better defined, and shared meaning is created amongst key stakeholders.
Very informative and appreciated the links. If there is substance (follow through) to the P.M.'s announcement then that's great for our Armed Forces, us and our global stature . If there will be a need for more public servants in the DND, this could be an opportunity to reallocate public servants instead of reduction or increase to the public servants. I think moving Coast Guard to DND is positive and can improve Canadian costal defence strategy.
1) I see the plans for the $9B but beyond a few simple things like raises I don't understand how they can spend it by end of March 2026.
2) As mentioned, the $14B has no details to it except the reclassification of the Coast Guard as defence spending and there's talk of CSE. The Coast Guard budget comes in at $2.4B per year, but it is an unarmed, unionized agency tasked with maritime safety and not even law enforcement (e.g. search and rescue, navigation aids, etc.). CSE is a civilian cyber-security and SIGINT agency with an annual budget of $1B. So, combined, nowhere near $14B and neither seem to qualify under the NATO spending definition: "payments made by a national government (excluding regional, local and municipal authorities) specifically to meet the needs of its armed forces, those of Allies or of the Alliance". I would argue that for the Coast Guard to take a defence role (similar to the US?) it would need not only a complete redirection/retraining of its staff but an entirely new and expanded fleet, at which point why not just give it to the navy?
Ultimately, with the timelines, the reclassification of agencies that do not qualify as military spending, and $10.6B of existing spending that has not been identified, I question the whole idea that the 2% target has been met. I think PBO and NATO partners will weigh in sooner (I believe the last government tried to put non-military spending toward the 2% and were firmly rebuffed) but come March 2026 I would not be surprised if we come in at 1.5%.
Well said. DND will not, however, be absolved from the government-wide expenditure review that is underway, owing to its relative size among the departments. There will be some robbing from Peter to pay Paul, as there was last year. That expenditure review exercise just became more important with the announcement of the new defence funding if the government is to stick to its fiscal targets of a declining deficit to GDP ratio in a few years.
I was at the Carney speech at Munk. He also said that DND is to deliver a new defence policy "immediately". That will be a tall order, depending on one's definition of "immediately". Our North, Strong and Free is thus dead, and had the shortest life of any defence white paper since "Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada" (1987). It seems to me Carney wants a new defence policy that takes more account of the changed relationship with the US and that he wants ot to contain a clear and strong defence industrial policy for Canada. ONSAF and SSE have neither of those elements. The next weeks and months will be interesting to watch on the implementation side of the Carney speech
A very useful breakdown of where the money will go to get to 2%. God is in the details of scaling up but it is about time. You floated 60% for US defend purchases compared to 75%. I will be interested in a discussion of what the % is to maintain sovereignty. My gut wants to be go less but I am not sure what the sweet spot would be.
A major flaw in defence revitalization is the belief that money solves the problem. The government can allocate all the money they want, but without people they are buying widgets that will be unused and thus not provide capability. Yes, funding can help entice some people in the door and maybe retain some for a few more years, but it won’t do enough to solve the problem.
Look at the CAF pilot retention of the 90s where money was the solution - a failure. Also the USAF tried paying pilots more (bonuses) and it had little positive effect. The USN at the same time opted for a leather flight jacket and their results were much better (culture and community). The point being that unless the culture and reputation of the CAF changes for the better the ‘cliff to climb’ will remain insurmountable.
The CAF has arrived at this place through a series of missteps starting arguably with Hellyer’s initiatives to make the armed forces just another department and then accelerated by ongoing governments funding and mission focus steps to vanilla the forces from a once proud culturally unique and proud warrior segment of society to what we see today - a choice that barely registers in society as a choice for our youth and is vilified (and readily accepted by recent CDS’) as a misogynistic, sexually predatory and discriminatory organization, which it is not. Even the few, high profile, supposed perpetrators who have been charged, have not been found guilty and been paid significant compensation as a result of the defamation.
Unless the culture and reputation can be changed for the CAF community - and effort invested in this - the cliff will be insurmountable and Canada will be trying to play catch up ala 1930s, but facing a much more inordinately difficult challenge.
There have been many serious political mistakes made that are undermining the CAF as a distinguished career option but one of the most serious blunders was to deliberately undermine the proud history of the regiments. The government fascination with DEI/equity and decolonization initiatives is counterproductive to a military culture that is heavily steeped in history. Flags, anthems, uniforms, dress codes etc are rallying points that forge a strong culture of teamwork, which is 180 degrees away from the individualism of DEI. A proud and successful military works around teamwork, not everyone for themselves.
Relying on US based suppliers, especially those subject to the Patriot Act would open some pretty serious holes in a sovereign defense establishment (specifically AWS). It would seem better to align with other allies and their capabilities than put another cent into the US or its suppliers. Sometimes an investment just needs to be written off and this seems to fit the bill at least on capital items. Great that capability is being rebuilt for personnel and maintenance.
The only people to gain anything of real value in these spasms of the endless arm's race have been the already rich and those that come up with the ideas for how we can destroy more people and things in higher volumes, with more efficiency.
Thank you for the typically excellent article, but I would question whether you address the headline notion of the government aspirations. Admittedly there can be a somewhat fluid definition of what exactly defines an aspiration in this context.
Beyond the strictly generic policy goals of “defending Canadian sovereignty”, “meeting international obligations”, etc., should we not look for specific targets in terms of capabilities, availabilities, domestic sourcing, maximum non-Canadian sourcing, domestic ability to supply/compete and so on.
Apologies if I’ve missed some of these in the announcement and maybe I’m too interested in the very nerdy number targets (planes, tanks, ships, etc.) but given the massive amount of money about to be spent, shouldn’t we have some hard targets?
We should look for specific platforms, systems, and capabilities, but not exactly from this type of announcement. Cabinet and the PM set the mission and the funding (this announcement) now the CAF and procurement/DND civil service go shopping.
Ideally, we don't want cabinet picking and chosing specific systems. They might broadly pick a capability (ie tanker aircraft) but it would be up to the CAF and PSPC to pick the system and quantity.
There are more than 50 capital acquisition projects for the CAF at various stages (some funded to actually buy equipment, but most funded just to do the administrative procurement work). PSPC and the CAF will go back to cabinet and say "with this addition funding, we'd like purchase x, y, and z funded". Then the specific requirements and quanties are announced for the defense industry to bid on.
Sorry if I was unclear. I did not expect an announcement including specific systems or platforms - as cool as that would be. I merely wanted to say that I did not think the announcement included (as the headline suggests) the new aspirations of the government, other than possibly meeting the spending target earlier.
I completely agree that the politicians should not be selecting systems, although the current debate over the F-35 is testing this, and possibly for good reason.
Not there yet. Expect a progressive elaboration - as details get worked out, problems getter better defined, and shared meaning is created amongst key stakeholders.
Where is all the money coming from?
Very informative and appreciated the links. If there is substance (follow through) to the P.M.'s announcement then that's great for our Armed Forces, us and our global stature . If there will be a need for more public servants in the DND, this could be an opportunity to reallocate public servants instead of reduction or increase to the public servants. I think moving Coast Guard to DND is positive and can improve Canadian costal defence strategy.
Thank you for this excellent article.
I'm struggling with two big things:
1) I see the plans for the $9B but beyond a few simple things like raises I don't understand how they can spend it by end of March 2026.
2) As mentioned, the $14B has no details to it except the reclassification of the Coast Guard as defence spending and there's talk of CSE. The Coast Guard budget comes in at $2.4B per year, but it is an unarmed, unionized agency tasked with maritime safety and not even law enforcement (e.g. search and rescue, navigation aids, etc.). CSE is a civilian cyber-security and SIGINT agency with an annual budget of $1B. So, combined, nowhere near $14B and neither seem to qualify under the NATO spending definition: "payments made by a national government (excluding regional, local and municipal authorities) specifically to meet the needs of its armed forces, those of Allies or of the Alliance". I would argue that for the Coast Guard to take a defence role (similar to the US?) it would need not only a complete redirection/retraining of its staff but an entirely new and expanded fleet, at which point why not just give it to the navy?
Ultimately, with the timelines, the reclassification of agencies that do not qualify as military spending, and $10.6B of existing spending that has not been identified, I question the whole idea that the 2% target has been met. I think PBO and NATO partners will weigh in sooner (I believe the last government tried to put non-military spending toward the 2% and were firmly rebuffed) but come March 2026 I would not be surprised if we come in at 1.5%.
Well said. DND will not, however, be absolved from the government-wide expenditure review that is underway, owing to its relative size among the departments. There will be some robbing from Peter to pay Paul, as there was last year. That expenditure review exercise just became more important with the announcement of the new defence funding if the government is to stick to its fiscal targets of a declining deficit to GDP ratio in a few years.
I was at the Carney speech at Munk. He also said that DND is to deliver a new defence policy "immediately". That will be a tall order, depending on one's definition of "immediately". Our North, Strong and Free is thus dead, and had the shortest life of any defence white paper since "Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada" (1987). It seems to me Carney wants a new defence policy that takes more account of the changed relationship with the US and that he wants ot to contain a clear and strong defence industrial policy for Canada. ONSAF and SSE have neither of those elements. The next weeks and months will be interesting to watch on the implementation side of the Carney speech
A very useful breakdown of where the money will go to get to 2%. God is in the details of scaling up but it is about time. You floated 60% for US defend purchases compared to 75%. I will be interested in a discussion of what the % is to maintain sovereignty. My gut wants to be go less but I am not sure what the sweet spot would be.
Great article. I’m looking forward, however, to some sort of defence policy statement that puts more meat on the bones! Perhaps a new white paper??!!
A major flaw in defence revitalization is the belief that money solves the problem. The government can allocate all the money they want, but without people they are buying widgets that will be unused and thus not provide capability. Yes, funding can help entice some people in the door and maybe retain some for a few more years, but it won’t do enough to solve the problem.
Look at the CAF pilot retention of the 90s where money was the solution - a failure. Also the USAF tried paying pilots more (bonuses) and it had little positive effect. The USN at the same time opted for a leather flight jacket and their results were much better (culture and community). The point being that unless the culture and reputation of the CAF changes for the better the ‘cliff to climb’ will remain insurmountable.
The CAF has arrived at this place through a series of missteps starting arguably with Hellyer’s initiatives to make the armed forces just another department and then accelerated by ongoing governments funding and mission focus steps to vanilla the forces from a once proud culturally unique and proud warrior segment of society to what we see today - a choice that barely registers in society as a choice for our youth and is vilified (and readily accepted by recent CDS’) as a misogynistic, sexually predatory and discriminatory organization, which it is not. Even the few, high profile, supposed perpetrators who have been charged, have not been found guilty and been paid significant compensation as a result of the defamation.
Unless the culture and reputation can be changed for the CAF community - and effort invested in this - the cliff will be insurmountable and Canada will be trying to play catch up ala 1930s, but facing a much more inordinately difficult challenge.
Great comments.
There have been many serious political mistakes made that are undermining the CAF as a distinguished career option but one of the most serious blunders was to deliberately undermine the proud history of the regiments. The government fascination with DEI/equity and decolonization initiatives is counterproductive to a military culture that is heavily steeped in history. Flags, anthems, uniforms, dress codes etc are rallying points that forge a strong culture of teamwork, which is 180 degrees away from the individualism of DEI. A proud and successful military works around teamwork, not everyone for themselves.
Relying on US based suppliers, especially those subject to the Patriot Act would open some pretty serious holes in a sovereign defense establishment (specifically AWS). It would seem better to align with other allies and their capabilities than put another cent into the US or its suppliers. Sometimes an investment just needs to be written off and this seems to fit the bill at least on capital items. Great that capability is being rebuilt for personnel and maintenance.
The only people to gain anything of real value in these spasms of the endless arm's race have been the already rich and those that come up with the ideas for how we can destroy more people and things in higher volumes, with more efficiency.