The notion that the US opposed Canada's acquisition of the submarines for fear we discover what they were up to in the Arctic is a bit of a myth. There may be some truth to it (like all myths), but it regularly gets trotted out without any proper documentation.
In fact, the USN was opposed to Canadian acquisition of the submarines because of the fear of a possible accident from an improperly maintained reactor. Such a disaster would have had global implications for the USN and RN submarine fleets in terms of their welcome in foreign ports. Remember that New Zealand at this point was already denying the US access to its ports under its NFZ policy. The complexities of reactor technology meant these fears weren't merely abstract ones. Ultimately, the Reagan administration ordered the USN to acquiesce in its opposition. This has been documented by Chris Kirkey.
In retrospect, this was a real dodged bullet by the RCN. The submarines would have required an enormous amount of infrastructure, including dedicated ports. The opposition that would have erupted on the West coast would likely have been significant (the Federal government had to expropriate the seabed near Nanaimo to protect US access to the CF Martitime Experimental Test Range site at Nanoose to protect access for USN submarines in 1999). The experience of the Victoria class does not lend any confidence on maintenance matters. SSNs would likely have bankrupted the fleet and caused endless headaches for our normal pecuniary (in defence matters) government (just as they would today).
Nuclear boats make tremendous operational sense, but they fundamentally conflict with Canada's long standing grand strategic outlook - the fireproof house.
I'm confused about the reactor concern. Did the USN and RN think that the Canada couldn't handle them? On what grounds would they have come to that conclusion?
Essentially, according to Kirkey: a fear that the RCN (then MARCOM) did not have a good organisational grasp of the complexity of nuclear technology, and that the GoC did not have a good grasp of the fiscal scale of an adequate safety regime.
Organisationally, the RCN did not have a "SUBSAFE" programme for its existing Oberon class of submarines. Moving from a SSK technology base to an SSN one was more than an order of magnitude change. Entirely new trades in nuclear technology to over see both operations and maintainance would need to be developed as well. Legend has it that the Slow-poke reactor at RMC was developed to assist in this effort.
Secondly, even then Canada had a solid rep as a non-performer in defence spending. The costs of sub maintainance have become legendary in the last two decades based on the experience of the Vics. Again, nuclear maintanance would be more than an order of magnitude matter of change for Canada (again involving new bases as the safety/security protocols for US reactors would not have been met by the existing bases at Halifax and Esquimalt. Rumour has it that Shearwater was considered as a base for the subs on the East coast. But where ever they might have landed, significant land based infrastructure investments would need to have been made on top of the material acquisition costs.
Contemporary US observers remarked on the fact that the money allocated to simply purchase the boats was already insufficient and than no planning had been undertaking to identify the costs of new infrastructure.
Significant trust issues mark public acceptance of nuclear technology in their backyard. Given the apparently simplistic approach the GoC had at the time, there were real concerns of an accident occuring, which might not only affect public acceptance of US ships in foreign ports, but might even compromise the American public's trust of the technology. Recall this was also taking place in the midst of the Chernobyl accident.
I should also note that Adam Lajeunesse has done some great work on the cooperation between the USN and RCN on Arctic missions. While it is possible that some missions were conducted secretly, many USN under ice operations in Canadian waters had Canadian sailors aboard American boats.
Fair enough: we do have the industrial resources in Canada to handle nuclear technology (unlike the Aussies who will have to develop it de novo). However, it is important to take account of American concerns at the time, which were largely about the realism of this project. Aside from safety concerns, the US was also concerned that Canada could spend its scarce defence dollars more wisely, especially in terms of its then committment to Norway's defence.
"Waterspace Management" and "Prevention of Mutual Interference" were active concerns on the part of the USN. These matters were more about avoiding blue on blue engagements. Keeping the number of actors in a region restricted meant for simpler planning. There might have been some secret operations that the US perferred Canada not to know about, but ultimately, as we were looking at the French Rubis design as well, Canada could have just gone its own way and the US would be right back having to share information with Canada to avoid blue on blue incidents. This to me illustrates that it was principally safety and spending concerns motivating US opposition, rather than a desire to not share information. And even the desire to restict information sharing seems more about keeping planning simple rather than protecting any existing US designs on Canadian waters secret.
Ultimately, the decision was made at the White House level against the wishes of the USN under the proviso that it was better to have the Canadians within the US tent than outside of it, as that would at least allow the USN to shape Canada's safety regime.
The notion that the US opposed Canada's acquisition of the submarines for fear we discover what they were up to in the Arctic is a bit of a myth. There may be some truth to it (like all myths), but it regularly gets trotted out without any proper documentation.
In fact, the USN was opposed to Canadian acquisition of the submarines because of the fear of a possible accident from an improperly maintained reactor. Such a disaster would have had global implications for the USN and RN submarine fleets in terms of their welcome in foreign ports. Remember that New Zealand at this point was already denying the US access to its ports under its NFZ policy. The complexities of reactor technology meant these fears weren't merely abstract ones. Ultimately, the Reagan administration ordered the USN to acquiesce in its opposition. This has been documented by Chris Kirkey.
In retrospect, this was a real dodged bullet by the RCN. The submarines would have required an enormous amount of infrastructure, including dedicated ports. The opposition that would have erupted on the West coast would likely have been significant (the Federal government had to expropriate the seabed near Nanaimo to protect US access to the CF Martitime Experimental Test Range site at Nanoose to protect access for USN submarines in 1999). The experience of the Victoria class does not lend any confidence on maintenance matters. SSNs would likely have bankrupted the fleet and caused endless headaches for our normal pecuniary (in defence matters) government (just as they would today).
Nuclear boats make tremendous operational sense, but they fundamentally conflict with Canada's long standing grand strategic outlook - the fireproof house.
I'm confused about the reactor concern. Did the USN and RN think that the Canada couldn't handle them? On what grounds would they have come to that conclusion?
Essentially, according to Kirkey: a fear that the RCN (then MARCOM) did not have a good organisational grasp of the complexity of nuclear technology, and that the GoC did not have a good grasp of the fiscal scale of an adequate safety regime.
Organisationally, the RCN did not have a "SUBSAFE" programme for its existing Oberon class of submarines. Moving from a SSK technology base to an SSN one was more than an order of magnitude change. Entirely new trades in nuclear technology to over see both operations and maintainance would need to be developed as well. Legend has it that the Slow-poke reactor at RMC was developed to assist in this effort.
Secondly, even then Canada had a solid rep as a non-performer in defence spending. The costs of sub maintainance have become legendary in the last two decades based on the experience of the Vics. Again, nuclear maintanance would be more than an order of magnitude matter of change for Canada (again involving new bases as the safety/security protocols for US reactors would not have been met by the existing bases at Halifax and Esquimalt. Rumour has it that Shearwater was considered as a base for the subs on the East coast. But where ever they might have landed, significant land based infrastructure investments would need to have been made on top of the material acquisition costs.
Contemporary US observers remarked on the fact that the money allocated to simply purchase the boats was already insufficient and than no planning had been undertaking to identify the costs of new infrastructure.
Significant trust issues mark public acceptance of nuclear technology in their backyard. Given the apparently simplistic approach the GoC had at the time, there were real concerns of an accident occuring, which might not only affect public acceptance of US ships in foreign ports, but might even compromise the American public's trust of the technology. Recall this was also taking place in the midst of the Chernobyl accident.
I should also note that Adam Lajeunesse has done some great work on the cooperation between the USN and RCN on Arctic missions. While it is possible that some missions were conducted secretly, many USN under ice operations in Canadian waters had Canadian sailors aboard American boats.
The funding concerns make sense, but I'm skeptical that we couldn't have handled the safety issued if we'd been willing to spend the money.
Fair enough: we do have the industrial resources in Canada to handle nuclear technology (unlike the Aussies who will have to develop it de novo). However, it is important to take account of American concerns at the time, which were largely about the realism of this project. Aside from safety concerns, the US was also concerned that Canada could spend its scarce defence dollars more wisely, especially in terms of its then committment to Norway's defence.
"Waterspace Management" and "Prevention of Mutual Interference" were active concerns on the part of the USN. These matters were more about avoiding blue on blue engagements. Keeping the number of actors in a region restricted meant for simpler planning. There might have been some secret operations that the US perferred Canada not to know about, but ultimately, as we were looking at the French Rubis design as well, Canada could have just gone its own way and the US would be right back having to share information with Canada to avoid blue on blue incidents. This to me illustrates that it was principally safety and spending concerns motivating US opposition, rather than a desire to not share information. And even the desire to restict information sharing seems more about keeping planning simple rather than protecting any existing US designs on Canadian waters secret.
Ultimately, the decision was made at the White House level against the wishes of the USN under the proviso that it was better to have the Canadians within the US tent than outside of it, as that would at least allow the USN to shape Canada's safety regime.
Great retrospective analysis.