Poilievre’s caution on defence spending
The Conservative leader made his financial priorities clear, but his defence policy will be driven by events beyond his control
Yesterday, I remarked on Prime Minister Trudeau’s frustration during the NATO Summit. Today, let’s discuss Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre’s comments about Canadian defence spending, which he delivered after the Summit had wrapped up.
When asked whether he would commit to spending 2% of GDP on defence, Poilievre demurred. He said that he can’t make that pledge until he’s seen the real state of Canada’s finances. According to the Conservative leader, he expects to find a fiscal ‘dumpster fire’ if he forms government. It would therefore be irresponsible to make promises that his government can’t keep. Spending 2% of GDP on defence is one such promise. The Conservatives want to get there, but they won’t make a firm commitment until they see the books.
Poilievre’s comments were reinforced by the Conservative’s defence critic, James Bezan. On the last day of the Summit, Bezan released a statement arguing that the Liberals have no intention of spending 2% of GDP on defence. He described the Liberals’ 2% plan as a “last minute desperation to save face at NATO.” The Conservatives, Bezan continued, will make “real and credible efforts to work towards meeting our NATO spending commitments.” Hence, the 2% target remains aspirational for the Conservatives.
What Poilievre and Bezan are saying is nothing new. It’s the dilemma Conservatives face when they must reconcile their preferred fiscal policies with the cost of national defence. If you want to keep federal spending in check, without cutting social spending or raising taxes, then your defence expenditures can’t get too high. It’s that simple.
Defence is the largest source of discretionary spending at the federal level. It’s the main lever governments employ to contain federal spending. As Poilievre has said numerous times, if he forms government his priority will be to reduce or cap federal spending. He's also pledged to ‘axe the tax’, which refers to the carbon tax, of course, but makes other tax increases unlikely. And he hasn’t said that he’d cut any social programs. So, if Poilievre wants to stick with his fiscal plan, he can’t commit to meeting the 2% target for defence. Whether you agree or disagree with his position, at least he’s being honest.
Prime Minister Harper struggled with the same problem. He came into office wanting to rebuild the armed forces. His 2008 defence policy was heading in that direction. After the 2008 economic crisis, however, Harper had to revise this plan. He wanted to pay down the deficits and debts accumulated during that crisis, which meant that defence spending had to be levelled off. This is part of the reason why defence expenditures languished at around 1% of GDP in 2014.
To compensate for the trade-offs that their fiscal policies impose, Conservatives rely on symbolic measures to show their support for the military. During the Harper era, this involved reinstituting the military’s royal monickers and traditional uniforms and celebrating Canada’s martial history. We can already see a similar effort on Poilievre’s part. Leading up to the NATO Summit, Poilievre pledged that he would reverse the Trudeau government’s ‘woke’ military culture with a ‘warrior’ culture. What that means in practice is hard to say, but it’ll probably involve stressing the Canadian Armed Forces’ combat capabilities and revising certain dress standards. I also expect that the Conservatives will reject recommendations to close Canada’s military colleges, whose future is currently being reviewed by an independent panel that looks decidedly hostile toward the armed forces. These symbolic measures will help the Conservatives argue that they’re pro-military, even if they privilege fiscal restraint over increased defence expenditures.
A few other points are in order. Above all, it’s important to recognize that, if the Conservatives form government in 2025, they’ll be in power when a whole slew of new military capabilities come online. The Trudeau government started a major recapitalization of the armed forces in 2017, and given procurement timelines, this means that the party who governs after the next election will be able to stand in front of a bunch of new equipment, new facilities, and other defence deliverables. The Conservatives, therefore, may be able take credit for most of the Trudeau government’s defence investments. The Liberals might argue that the Conservatives shouldn’t deserve these accolades, but it won’t matter. It’ll look like the Conservatives are the ones rebuilding the armed forces.
Finally, and most importantly, Poilievre’s defence policy will be shaped by events beyond his control. The Conservative leader is being cautious because he has that luxury right now. He isn’t prime minister yet and can keep his options open. If he does form a government, his room for manoeuvre will be far more limited. A second Trump presidency could massively increase the importance of meeting the 2% target as soon as possible. An expansion of Russian aggression in Europe or the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific would push Canada onto a war footing. Conversely, if the war in Ukraine comes to an end or tensions cool in the Pacific, the pressure on NATO allies to meet the 2% target might dissipate. There are a lot of unknowns out there and Canadian defence policy is highly sensitive to them.
In sum, the Conservatives are betting that Canadians care more about decreasing federal spending than meeting the NATO 2% target. Whether the Conservatives will feel the same if they form government and deal with the reality of world politics remains to be seen.
2% commitment is long overdue, given global strategic environment. Voters memories of WW1 and WW2 need to be richer.
While I agree with the CPC decision to wait until they see the books, they should view the 2% as a Canadian commitment and plan accordingly!
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