The Carney government is apparently planning to acquire 60 Gripens and to cut Canada’s F-35 buy from 88 to 30. As reported by Joel Dennis Bellavance in La Presse, Ottawa will announce the decision around the American mid-term elections in the fall.
Governments have the right to make these calls. If the reporting is correct, the government has concluded that a military pivot away from the United States, and Canada’s defence industrial ambitions, warrants a mixed fighter fleet. As I wrote last November, there are several trade-offs involved in pursuing a mixed fleet, notably around reduced capability and much higher costs, but the government appears to have accepted them.
What I find odd, though, is the delay. What exactly is the government waiting for? The F-35 review was launched in the winter of 2025. The results would have been provided to the government in short order. Indeed, the government has probably had a good sense of its options for about a year now. Maybe the government has been hoping that it could use the F-35 review as leverage in its trade negotiations with the United States. Maybe some things needed to be ironed out with Saab and Sweden. If the government has decided to go with a mixed fleet, however, it should get moving.
Why the urgency? Because it will take time —a lot of time— to get the RCAF ready for 60 Gripens. Negotiations with Saab will need to be settled. If the planes will be built in Canada, a viable production line will need to be set up. Infrastructure for the new fleet will need to be built. Pilots will need to be trained on the Gripen. If we’re being optimistic, all this will take at least 5 years. In terms of benchmarks, it’s worth noting Brazil assembled its first Gripen in March 2026, twelve years after signing a deal with Saab to build 36 Gripen there.
In the meantime, Canada’s CF-18s are nearing the end of their lives. When we hear that the CF-18s will be in service until 2032, that doesn’t mean that the entire fleet will operate until then. It means that the CF-18s are slated to be gradually retired over the next six years as Canada’s new fighters are delivered. So, the last of the CF-18s are supposed to be flying until 2032, not the whole fleet.
If we assume that 30 F-35s will be delivered between now and 2032, and if we assume that it will be five years at best before the first Gripens enter into service, that will result in a significant drop in Canada’s fighter fleet. Since the RCAF currently operates around 80-ish CF-18s, this would mean a gap of about 50 fighters for an unknown amount of time.
Why does this matter? Ironically, given the desire to pivot away from the United States, it would mean that Canada would be heavily dependent on the American air force to defend Canadian airspace in the interim. It would also limit, if not prevent, any deployment of Canadian fighters to defend Europe in the event of a crisis or war. It’s hard to say how long this capability gap would last, but it would linger for a while.
Could we keep the CF-18s flying as a stopgap? Potentially. Throw enough money at a problem and you can usually arrive at some kind of solution, however sub-optimal. Doing so would create other problems, though. The CF-18s wouldn’t be suited for higher threat environments, such as a potential conflict with Russia to defend Europe. The RCAF would also need to train and maintain pilots, infrastructure, and maintenance programs for three separate fighter fleets: the CF-18s, the F-35s, and the Gripens. That’s where the plausibility of extending the CF-18s really runs into trouble. It’ll be hard enough for the RCAF to operate two different fighters, let alone three.
Delaying a decision on a mixed fleet for several more months, therefore, would be irresponsible. The government can choose to cut the F-35 buy and acquire Gripens. It’s their decision, regardless of what the military, defence observers, and the United States think of it. What’s troubling is the dithering. The delay is making an already difficult choice harder, costlier, and riskier.
Postscript
The explanation most often given for the delay is that it gives Canada leverage in its trade negotiations with the United States. I saw it the same before. I’m increasingly doubting the idea. The longer a mixed fleet decision is delayed, the less credible it becomes, given the timeline factors discussed here. At some point, threatening to cut the F35 order becomes a case of Canada threatening to punch itself in the face: “Don’t make me unable to defend my airspace without you!”
Moving on the Gripen, or at least opening real negotiations, would provide actual leverage if that’s what we’re after. It would signal a credible plan B. Delaying indefinitely is planning for the status quo, not the presentation of an alternative plan.
Three points based on the discussion thus far:
1) Leverage has to be credible. Announcing negotiations with Saab would be more credible than these whispers. The US would be well aware of the challenges we’d face as this drags on.
2) I’m unclear how much stronger our position would be if the Democrats controlled one or both houses.
3) A lot of things would need to fall neatly into place to avoid lots of pitfalls on the fighter capability.
It's not overly complicated - if you're forced to negotiate with a wannabe mob boss, the timing is based on how to maximize impact in that negotiation. Arguably more important right now than the schedule impact of the actual programs, unfortunately.