Fighters passing in the night

Taking stock of Canada's F35 vs. Gripen debate

You could feel a collective sigh from National Defence Headquarters when the Carney government announced an F35 procurement review last winter. By my count, this is the fifth time Canada has reset or rethought its Joint Strike Fighter plans. The government ended up sticking with the F35 in each case. Since Canada has already contracted for sixteen F35s, is building infrastructure for them, and is training pilots on the jet, the likelihood that we won’t end up with F35 as our main fighter seems slim. Instead, the question is whether the government will invest in a second, smaller fleet of fighter aircraft, namely Saab Gripens.

Earlier this week, CBC obtained the technical scores of the Future Fighter Capability Project (FFCP) competition that was held between the F35 and the Gripen in 2021. The leaked table shows that both the F35 and the Gripen passed the mandatory requirements for the FFCP. When it comes to the rated requirements (i.e. what we want the capability to do, not just what it must be able to do), the F35 far surpassed the Gripen, with a combined score of 57.1/60 versus 19.7/60.

Given these scores, and the other competitions the F35 has won in allied states, proponents of a single F35 fleet argue that the review is pointless. The F35 is clearly more capable, so it’s time to stop dithering.

Yet industry minister Mélanie Joly has said that she’s “very interested” in Saab’s proposal to build Gripens in Canada. This may simply be a way to exert some leverage in trade negotiations with the United States, or a means of getting more economic benefits out of Lockheed Martin, but it seems genuine.

Even if the government isn’t serious about the Gripen, many commentators further argue that the F35 has become a liability for Canada under the Trump administration, regardless of how capable it is. They’re hoping that the Carney government will carve out a degree of strategic autonomy by supplementing the F35 with a European fighter.

Unfortunately, these three different perspectives have largely been talking past each other, rather than engaging in a veritable discussion. That helps explain why the current F35 review has dragged on for several months, and why the capability argument hasn’t won yet.

As noted already, the capability question is fairly clear cut. Both the F35 and Gripen met the mandatory requirements of the FFCP, which means that both fighters were deemed capable of replacing the CF-18s and undertaking the missions expected of Canada’s future fighters under Canadian defence policy. These missions include defending Canada, defending North America, and contributing to operations overseas. When it came to rated requirements, however, the F35 surpassed the Gripen in each category. The F35 was judged to have better mission performance, a stronger upgrade path and sustainability model, a surer delivery schedule, and superior technical attributes. This last one likely included things like low observability (i.e. stealth) and interoperability, which involves more than simply being able to communicate and share data. From an effectiveness perspective, the F35 is evidently the better option for Canada.

The capability discussion also focuses on the inefficiencies of operating a mixed fleet. Trying to train and maintain two sets of pilots, two sets of infrastructure, two sets of reprogramming data, and potentially different munitions, would impose a significant burden on the Royal Canadian Air Force. Indeed, since the RCAF is already short of pilots, the prospect of having to divide up its future fighter operators between two fleets is deeply worrying to the Air Force leadership. The overall cost to Canada of operating a mixed fleet would also be significant. That money, the argument goes, could be better spent on other capabilities, such as participating in 6^th generation fighter program or wider next generation systems.

Industrial benefits proponents come at the fighter debate from a different perspective. As Joly’s comments hint at, this angle is primarily interested in leveraging the fighter procurement to spur investment in Canadian industry, create jobs, and develop expertise in building fighter aircraft. Joly has also said that the industrial benefits associated with the F35 are unsatisfactory. I read this to mean that she wants Canadian industry to do more than build components, subsystems, and contribute to design and sustainment. My sense is that she sees value in having industry build, maintain, and upgrade a fighter fleet in Canada. Whether that’s feasible is an open question, but it’s understandable that Saab’s pledge to make that happen is attractive for a government that wants to grow the defence industrial base.

Not surprisingly, the industrial benefits crowd applies a different calculus to the mixed fleet option. If Canada acquires both F35s and Gripens, it gets more economic benefits, greater investment in the Canadian aerospace sector, and develops a deeper and wider degree of industrial experience and know-how. A mixed fleet will make life complicated for the RCAF, but advocates of this option argue that the country will enjoy more economic and industrial advantages over the long term. At a time when the Canadian economy is suffering, critical sectors are verging on collapse, and the government has promised to invest heavily in the Canadian defence industrial base, ministers are unlikely to dismiss the mixed fleet option if it includes a Canadian-built fighter.

This brings us to the strategic autonomy perspective. Those calling for strategic autonomy are focused on one overarching issue: Canada cannot trust the United States any longer. Given how the Trump administration has treated allies, the economic damage American tariffs have inflicted on the Canadian economy, and the White House’s apparent intent to subjugate Ottawa by various means, advocates of greater strategic autonomy argue that Canada must begin to decouple itself from the United States militarily. This decoupling does not necessarily mean that Canada will stop cooperating with the United States, but it would involve reducing Canada’s military dependence on its southern neighbour, and limiting Canada’s exposure to possible American coercion through a denial of military capabilities. The conspiratorial version of this argument holds that the F35 might have a ‘kill switch’ that the United States could use to prevent Canada from operating the fighter. The calmer version of this preoccupation wonders if the United States could deny upgrades, parts, and reprogramming data to allies who don’t comply with its directions or demands.

Owing to these concerns, those arguing for greater strategic autonomy hold that Canada should acquire a European fighter as a matter of prudence. If Canada can no longer fully trust the United States, then Ottawa should invest in capabilities that can be operated without American interference. Seen from this perspective, the F35’s superior technical performance is immaterial. Simply put, it doesn’t matter if the F35 is the better fighter if the United States can control whether or not Canada will be able to safely operate it. The F35’s advanced software and complex maintenance requirements, this view holds, make it far too easy for an aggressive American administration to use the fighter for coercive purposes. Accordingly, advocates of strategic autonomy argue that Canada needs a second fighter that it could operate and maintain on its own. The fact that this second fighter would be less capable than the F35 is neither here nor there. Far better to have a less capable but operational fighter, than a highly capable but grounded fighter.

Defenders of a sole F35 fleet counter the strategic autonomy argument in three ways. First, they point out that Canada’s defence relationship with the United States is working as normal, despite the Trump administration’s heavy handedness toward Canada. The various happenings at the political level aren’t affecting relations at the official and military level. Along the same lines, they hold that the Trump administration will not last forever and that the Canada-United States relationship will repair itself once the presidency changes hands. Geography and shared interests ensure that the Canada-United States defence relationship will endure and remain strong, regardless of who occupies the White House.

Second, the single F35 fleet advocates point out that most NATO allies will be operating the F35, and that the global fleet includes parts and components from across the Joint Stike Fighter consortium states. These realities reduce the likelihood that the United States would ever mess with the F35 to punish allies. Not only would the reputational and alliance costs be too heavy, but allies could complicate the supply chain for the American F35 fleet as well, at least until the United States repatriates all aspects of the jet’s manufacturing.

The single fleet proponents offer a third argument against the strategic autonomy position, though they end up shooting themselves in the foot when they make it. Specifically, they argue that the United States could block Canada from acquiring the Gripen, since parts of that fighter, such as the engine, are subject to American International Trade in Armaments Regulations. Suffice to say, this is a counterproductive point. If the United States were willing to block the sale of Gripens to Canada, it would reinforce the fear that Washington will use access to jets as a means of coercion. Indeed, were the United States the use ITARs to block a sale of the current version of the Gripen to Canada, it would reinforce the argument that Canada and Saab must reengineer and build an US ITAR-free version of the plane.

Where do I land on all this? To my mind, it comes down to how much money the government is willing to spend to give itself options. I think Canada should move ahead with the plan to acquire 88 F35s. We need to replace the CF-18 fleet and we’re already transition to the F35, which includes significant infrastructure investments. Moving ahead with the existing F35 buy would also give the government enough time to consider what else it might do. Next, if the government is prepared to spend a lot more money, a realistic pilot training plan could be devised by the RCAF, and Ottawa is able to get a firm commitment from Saab to establish a real Gripen production line in Canada, then a second fleet could be a worthwhile option. Should any of those conditions prove unrealistic, it may make more sense to focus on partnering with European and Indo-Pacific allies on a 6^th generation fighter, and to look at investing more in Canadian uncrewed aerospace systems and technologies. These last two things, incidentally, should happen regardless of whether we have a single F35 fleet or a mixed F35/Gripen fleet.

My larger hope, however, is that we tone down the fighter debate. Each of the three perspectives I’ve outlined here have arguments and concerns that should be taken seriously and not easily dismissed. We should aim to have fruitful discussions between these perspectives, rather than having them talk past each other.