Domestic Deployments Redux

The defence minister says the military will keep doing disaster response. Military leaders should listen.

Domestic deployments of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) were back in the news last week. Minister of National Defence Bill Blair told the Canadian Press that the military will continue to be called upon to deal with natural disasters. Blair acknowledged the pressure that these deployments put on the CAF, but he noted that the military exists to protect Canadians. His comments came after military leaders expressed concern that domestic deployments are undermining the CAF’s ability to operate internationally, which is widely seen as the armed forces’ raison d’être.

In an earlier post, I discussed how resource constraints make it unlikely that a civilian disaster response force will be set up, and why the military should expect to continue playing a larger domestic role, as a result.

Today, I’ll look at the issue from a civil-military perspective. Bottom line up front: while the CAF may not like it, ministers decide how the CAF is used. If ministers think that disaster response is an important military role, then the CAF should accept this reality and adapt accordingly.  

To start off, let’s look at the arguments against relying on the CAF for domestic disaster response.  

The main one is that the armed forces are trained and equipped to use force in defence of Canada and the Canadian national interest. Domestically, this means that the CAF focus on the defence of Canada’s aerospace and maritime approaches. Under the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), for instance, the CAF works with the United States military to defend the continent from both convention and unconventional military threats. The defence of Canada, however, is best assured by acting internationally. Rather than wait for threats to show up here, the CAF is deployed to contain them overseas. Likewise, the CAF is used to defend the ‘rules based international order’ by deterring or defeating state and non-state actors who challenge it. It’s these missions and operations that military leaders and commentators see as the CAF’s primary focus.

From this vantage point, using the CAF for domestic disaster response is seen as both inefficient and a drain on the military. On the efficiency front, using a combat force to deal with natural disasters is wasteful. To use a bad analogy, it amounts to using a Ferrari to drive Uber. You can certainly use a Ferrari to do ridesharing, but it’s not a great use of a luxury sportscar. Ideally, you’d get a cheaper, more fuel-efficient car to do your Uber runs and keep your Ferrari to show off at the valet parking. Bringing it back to the CAF, we can question the soundness of spending billions of dollars to train and equipment the military to fight and win the nation’s war, only to use them contain floods and forest fires. It would make more sense for specially trained and equipped civilians to deal with floods and fires, leaving the military to focus on their niche. Since the CAF’s resources are quite limited, moreover, domestic deployments take away from their ability to defend Canada and the national interest. Every military member who’s contributing to domestic disaster response is a member who can’t deploy internationally or train for an international deployment. This is what makes domestic deployments a drain on the CAF.

The second argument is that disaster response is a provincial responsibility. Provinces should therefore invest in their own response forces to lessen their dependence on the CAF. The argument also dovetails with the recent Federal Court ruling on the Emergencies Act. If provinces don’t want the federal government to encroach on their jurisdiction when it comes to policing and public order, then Ottawa should tell provincial governments that they can’t keep making so many requests of the CAF.

These two arguments are certainly compelling in the abstract, but they run into trouble when we try to apply them. Returning to our Ferrari analogy, part of the problem is that we may not want to buy, or be able to afford, another car to do our Uber runs. If that’s the case, then it makes sense to use the Ferrari to rideshare; it’s not an ideal use of a luxury sportscar, but it gets the job done. The same holds for the CAF and natural disasters: it’s not an ideal use of a costly combat force, but they get the job done. That’s the crux of the resource challenge I discussed in the previous post.

As for the provinces, they have little incentive to make fewer requests of the CAF. Provinces know that the CAF is there, and they’re willing to bet that no federal government will refuse military assistance if Canadians are in need. Provincial governments are well-aware that Ottawa would wear the blame for holding back available troops.

Leaving resources and blame aside, it’s important to appreciate the wider democratic principle that’s at play here. The CAF understandably see themselves as an internationally deployable combat force, first and foremost. And they’re not wrong. That’s what Canadian defence policy has directed them to be for decades, regardless of which party is in power. But that doesn’t preclude government from also seeing them as force that exists to help Canadians is need or distress. Put bluntly, defence policy guides, but ministers ultimately decide.

Indeed, if ministers were forced to choose between these two roles, I suspect most would go with assisting Canadians over combat capability. Thankfully, ministers don’t think they have to make a choice. They know that using the military for disaster response is inefficient and hampers the CAF’s readiness for missions overseas. Yet they appreciate that, above all, the military exists to safeguard Canadians lives. That usually means defending Canada against conventional threats like Russian bombers or protecting maritime trade roots that are vital to our economic prosperity. Increasingly, however, it’ll mean helping contain forest fires, holding back floodwater, and maintaining essential services during ice storms and the like. As the civilian government and those who hold the confidence of the democratically elected House of Commons, ministers get to determine how the military defends Canadians.

My point here isn’t to downplay the impact that disaster response has on the CAF. It’s a serious issue and increased domestic deployments will hurt readiness and Canada’s contributions to international peace and security. But I also sympathize with ministers. In a perfect world, the provinces would invest more in disaster response and the federal government would set up a civilian response force to assist them. Until that happens, ministers will use whatever tools are available to help Canadians in distress. Rather than push against this reality, the CAF are advised to accept it and figure out how best to adapt.