DND's New Deputy
What challenges are ahead for Christiane Fox?
Canada has a new Deputy Minister of National Defence. Congratulations to Christiane Fox for her appointment, and kudos to Stefanie Beck as she retires from the public service.
Being the DM at National Defence isn’t easy. It’s one of the few deputy head positions in government (if not the only one) where you’re in a co-equal diarchy with the head of another, legally independent entity, i.e. the Chief of the Defence Staff and Canadian Armed Forces. This diarchic model reflects the fact that the Department of National Defence and CAF are in an integrated National Defence Headquarters with distinct, but often overlapping, civilian and military authorities. You can read up on the DM’s roles and authorities here. Two academic studies on the diarchy are available here and here. And if you really want to nerd out, give the 1999 paper, Organization and Accountability, a read.
The history of this diarchy is quite complex, with roots in the reorganization of government and unification of the armed forces that took place in the 1960s, and in a review of Canadian defence management that took place in the early 1970s. One thing to know about the diarchy is that there’s a degree of friction between the DM and the CDS built into it. When things are going well and personalities align, that friction subsides and is barely noticeable. When things aren’t going so well, the friction is palpable and can make life miserable for all involved, including the ministers who are the supposed beneficiaries of the competing perspectives that the DM and CDS are meant to offer.
Fox will be taking up the role at a critical juncture –or a hinge moment, to use the Prime Minister’s parlance. Defence spending is massively increasing. That’s good news for the defence establishment, but it also comes with significant responsibilities for the new DM. The DM manages DND on the Minister’s behalf, including the departmental aspects of procurement. This means that the new DM will have her work cut out for her as she and her Associate and Assistant Deputy Ministers are charged with moving a significant amount of program. What’s more, the DM will have to coordinate with the new Defence Investment Agency, which is a special operating agency that is legally under Public Services and Procurement Canada, as opposed to DND. I suspect there’s still a lot of work required to figure out how DND and DIA are going to interact, particularly when it comes to requirements setting. Sorting these issues out will be top of mind.
Where things may get particularly tough for the new DM is the government’s pledge to introduce contracting considerations into the options analysis phase of the defence procurement process. Bringing contracting considerations into options analysis is meant to give effect to a wider set of government priorities. Notably, the Carney government expects the CAF to buy more from Canadian firms, diversify its capability partnerships with allies other than the United States, and develop home-grown capabilities in conjunction with Canadian industry. The CAF will have the hardest time adjusting to these expectations, since they represent a very different approach to force development and a major shift in mindset, but the DM will be expected to make sure it happens. This may be one area where that inherent friction between the DM and the CDS surfaces.
In that vein, it should be noted that the DM is accountable to the Prime Minister, not only the Minister of National Defence. Indeed, the DM is “accountable to the Prime Minister for responding to the policies of the Ministry as a whole,” which means ensuring that Carney’s priorities are properly implemented at National Defence, even if the CAF aren’t keen.
What else? Well, all the other parts of the DM’s job, of course. The DM is the defence minister’s policy advisor, whereas the CDS provides military advice. I keep thinking that this government will need a new defence policy to give proper direction to the CAF, particularly on the procurement front, so managing a policy review may be another item that occupies Fox’s time.
DMs are also accounting officers for their department. They must answer for the management and accounts of their department before parliamentary committees, and the Public Accounts Committee in particular. Given the amount of new money going to DND and CAF, and concerns about how well and quickly it’ll be spent, the DM’s role as DND’s accounting officer may garner greater attention and interest. Perhaps the new DM can advance a defence transparency agenda to build trust and solidify public support as these tens of billions of additional dollars are spent.
To conclude, it’s worth noting that the balance of power between DMs and CDSs has shifted quite a bit over the decades. The DM was probably most powerful during Robert Fowler’s time in the position, which coincided with deep cuts to the defence budget during the Chrétien era. The balance then swung toward the CDS during Rick Hillier’s time as head of the armed forces, and has arguably been tilted toward the military ever since. We may be seeing a recalibration of this relationship in light of the government’s emphasis on defence industrial investment and new strategic partnerships. It’ll be interesting to watch Fox’s tenure in that context.
An astute analysis of this position and its relationship to the minister and the military leadership. As Chief of Staff to two Defence Ministers, I worked with three DMs and two CDS's, and I saw both the fruits of a good DM-CDS relationship--where the division of labour was clear and mutual respect was present--as well a not so good one. The not so good one is bad not just for the government but the military.
The key role for Ms. Fox, in my view, is to bring the defence department--military and civilian wings--and the broader defence establishment to a new level of awareness, so to speak. Namely, the massive increases in defence spending coming on line over the next decade--to get Canada to 3.5 of core defence spending--requires DND to have a much more "corporate" and sophisticated view of their role and position in the Canadian government universe and in the Cdn economy than they have in decades, if ever. Simply put, if the massive increase in defence funding that seems to be coming on line, is not seen by the Cdn public (and their political representatives) to be having a big impact on the Cdn economy, public support (today's "defence consensus" if you will) for major increases in defence funding will evaporate, meaning the drive toward 3.5% will run into the ditch. That is the new level of awareness the new DM must bring to the defence establishment. That needs to be Ms. Fox's key strategic role and objective. The rest are details
As always an informative article.
I note the suggestion that "I keep thinking that this government will need a new defence policy to give proper direction to the CAF, ..." While I agree wholeheartedly, I would suggest that a comprehensive Foreign Policy is of higher priority.
While Canada is a member/participant/signatory to a multitude of fora, agreements, treaties (NORAD, NATO, SAFE, CPTPP, etc, etc) and there are regional aspirations including things such as the Indo-Pacific Strategy, there is no unifying Canadian Foreign Policy Strategy. At least not a easily retrievable, digestible and unifying one such as that produced under the Martin Government. Rather it is a multitude of items that are influencing and competing in many respects, with little unifying priority. In other words it lacks a unifying strategy.
Without this foundation any Defence Strategy is somewhat adrift as it becomes de-linked from the foundation it is supposed to primarily support. While ONSAF took steps in the right direction in identifying a Top Priority - "The top priority of the Canadian Armed Forces is the defence of Canada and Canadians" - beyond this, there is no prioritization upon which to base capabilities and force structures in a prioritized fashion. This is essential in the fiscal climate that we inherit, and which will change over time, despite the current influx of much needed capital. Thus it can be observed as both a shopping list of capabilities, some of which don't seem to directly relate to Defence of Canada, such as land systems more oriented to a European NATO conflict, while missing certain capabilities that undoubtably will be required for Defence of Canada.
We need a new Defence Strategy but also a unifying Foreign Policy Strategy.