Defence, Intelligence, and the Carney Doctrine
Prime Minister Carney’s speech at Davos was striking. He said things that political leaders know but aren’t inclined to say. Carney noted that raw power always underpinned the ‘rules based international order’, something the developing world never doubted. Northern, middle powers like Canada, on the other hand, benefited from the United States’ willingness not to overtly coerce its allies, despite being able to do so. The so-called Global North is going to experience the world in a way that the so-called Global South has for quite some time.
As I’ve been half-joking since the United States’ National Security Strategy was released, the White House sees Canada as akin to a Latin American country now. If we want to know how we’ll be treated by this Administration going forward, we may be better off asking Mexico than looking at the history of Canadian-American relations.
Carney also observed that Canada can’t go it alone. We need to band together with other small and medium powers. Reading between the lines, you can hear Carney telling Europeans ‘I told you so’ after they left us hanging last spring, when the ’51st state’ talk was loudest. All the gold bars, royal invites, and flattery in the world won’t be enough to ward off a United States hell-bent on domination. Indeed, this may help explain why Ottawa cooled on trade talks with Washington after it became clear that no concessions would end the tariff threat or shield our industries.
So, Canada is now clear-eyed about the state of the world. What are Ottawa’s next steps on defence and intelligence?
That may seem like an odd query. We’ve heard a lot from the Carney folk about what they’re planning, and there’s been a lot of activity on trade diversification. But anticipated pivots in defence and intelligence have been slower to take shape.
This isn’t a criticism. Official Ottawa doesn’t make any of this easy; as a former bureaucratic colleague once told my students, the hardest thing in Canadian government is getting a decision. Still, if you’re like me, you’re waiting to see how the Carney doctrine will be reflected in the defence and intelligence arenas.
Some examples are in order. The defence industrial strategy (DIS) has yet to be released and we lack clarity on how the Buy Canadian(ish) policy will apply to military capabilities. Once the DIS is published, there’s the much larger challenge of developing and contracting for sovereign capabilities. There’s been a lot of procurement activity of late, but the Carney government will need to lay out a policy framework for a more sovereign Canadian Armed Forces.
Above all, the government must explain: 1) what military missions will be prioritized in this new international order; 2) what Canada must be able to do alone and when it should partner with allies; 3) how our defence relationship with the United States will evolve in the world the Prime Minister just described.
If we’re honest, we’ll recognize that the first two turn on the third. Canadian defence policy ties the CAF and its missions so closely to the United States that our ability to act alone or with other allies is very limited. Does the Carney government intend to change that fact?
Let’s recall that the latest government statement we have on the Canada-United States defence relationship was the defence minister saying we’re in lockstep with the Americans. I took that to mean all-in on continental defence, which makes sense if we’re trying to salvage NORAD and keep things steady at the military-to-military level. What about the defence of Canada itself, including from unwanted American assistance? And what about operations overseas? Do we intend to be able to help defend Europe or undertake peace enforcement operations without the United States? The answers to these questions will shed important light on the meaning of the Carney doctrine in practice.
Looking beyond defence, the Carney government should tell us what the Canadian intelligence community will prioritize in this new environment. The head of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service hinted at what his agency is thinking in a speech last year. It would be good to have a prime ministerial or ministerial level explanation of what the government has in mind.
Jody Thomas and Patrick Lennox argued in favour of a foreign human intelligence service recently. After reading Carney’s speech, it’s hard to fathom why Canada wouldn’t establish one. We can’t go it alone on foreign human intelligence, but we could make a greater contribution to existing alliances and new intelligence partnerships and coalitions. Relying so heavily on the United States for intelligence no longer seems wise. Even if relations with the United States improve post-Trump, Canada should contribute more to allied intelligence sharing in the future, and be able to do more on its own, particularly when it comes to economic security.
In sum, the Carney doctrine is welcome; it tells us what the Prime Minister really thinks about the world we’re in, and the doctrine helps explain what’s been happening with trade policy. But will Ottawa align Canadian defence and intelligence policies with the doctrine or will the status quo prevail?


Canada’s biggest challenge will be cold comfortable Ottawa. How do you turn a fifty year old social justice apparatus that coddled and financed the victim industries into a professional tool that has to take Canadian security seriously. I do not think Ottawa has the horses for that.
The public affairs functional authority and capability at Defence is fundamentally broken, so ‘good luck’ with the expectation that any of the critical elements that need to be well explained and sufficiently contextualized will be.
Even the best initiatives poorly communicated will lead to sub-optimal outcomes. The comms capability needs overhaul if is to successfully rise to the challenge set out herein this piece.