Canada’s Political Parties and National Defence

Forget about a bipartisan consensus on defence. Our parties don't even have coherent partisan approaches.

Canada’s political parties struggle with national defence. Our two main federal parties approach the defence file with competing priorities and values, which makes it hard for them to articulate a clear stance on military matters. While critics often complain that we lack a bipartisan consensus on defence, our challenge is arguably deeper than that: our parties have trouble aligning their own views on the military. This makes it difficult for us to have coherent defence policy debates in Canada, let alone a bipartisan approach.  

Take the Liberals. When thinking about the Liberals and defence, Canadians would probably that say that they’re known for cutting the military’s budgets. That’s understandable, given that the defence budget took a massive cut during Jean Chrétien’s premiership. Gutting the military was a key part of the Chrétien Liberals’ deficit and debt reduction efforts, and Chrétien famously cancelled the Sea King replacement project, which has led to three-decade saga to get new maritime helicopters. Chrétien and his advisors were never big fans of defence spending and procurement anyway, as can be seen by their reluctance to meaningfully increase the military’s budget after the deficit and debt were under control.

The Liberals also get this anti-military reputation from the late 1960s and early 1970s. Lester Pearson’s government integrated and unified the Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Navy, and Royal Canadian Air Force into a single Canadian Forces in 1968. This reform was meant to save costs in light of a flatlining defence budget and increased spending on social programs. Unification dealt a blow to service cultures and traditions, which left many servicemembers and veterans embittered.

Pierre Trudeau added to the military’s malaise during the early years of his ministry. Trudeau senior wanted the military to focus more on Canada and less on NATO. From his perspective, mutually assured nuclear destruction between the United States and the Soviet Union meant that war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was highly unlikely, and if nuclear deterrence failed, conventional military forces wouldn’t be of much use. The Trudeau government’s 1971 defence white paper made this skeptical view of the military clear.

Surprising as it may seem, however, the Liberals have been the military’s main benefactor. It was the Louis St Laurent government that funded the major defence build-up at the start of the Korean War that gave the Canadian military’s its impressive reputation in the 1950s and 1960s. When Pierre Trudeau found out that our European allies cared quite a bit about our contributions to NATO, and that they were prepared to make Canada pay a diplomatic price for our cuts in the early 1970s, he decided to invest in the armed forces. Starting in 1975, the Pierre Trudeau government undertook a major recapitalization of the Canadian Forces, one that we’ve been relied on for about 50 years. What’s more, the man who slew the deficit and the debt as Chrétien’s finance minister in the 1990s, Paul Martin, began investing in the military soon after he became prime minister. Although the Liberals are known for being ambivalent about defence and cutting the military, they also have a record of rebuilding it.

Our current Liberal government provides a good example of this ambivalence. While in opposition in 2014, Justin Trudeau accused Prime Minister Stephen Harper of favouring a combat response to Islamic State in Iraq, rather than looking at humanitarian contributions. In Trudeau’s words, Harper’s approach was focused on “trying to whip out our CF-18s and show them how big they are. It just doesn’t work like that in Canada.” In the election that followed in 2015, Trudeau pledged to withdraw Canada’s fighter aircraft from their role against the Islamic State and to prevent the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter from participating in a competition to replace the CF-18s. Like many Liberals before him, Trudeau emphasized Canada’s role as a peacekeeper, rather than a warfighter.

When Trudeau became prime minister, however, was willing to do something Harper hadn’t: run large budget deficits. Whatever his personal feelings about the military and the use of force, Trudeau has been willing to spend money to refurbish the armed forces –quite a bit of money, in fact.  His government’s 2017 defence policy outlined approximately $100 billion to recapitalize the military, and more funds have been earmarked to modernize NORAD. Over the last few years, these investments have resulted in a slew of military procurement contracts, including the F-35 that Trudeau promised not to buy in 2015.

Although the government’s appetite for new defence spending may have faded, and its long-awaited defence policy update has yet to materialize, it’s worth noting that the two biggest investments in armed forces since the 1960s have occurred under two Liberal prime ministers named Trudeau. Like his father before him, though, Trudeau doesn’t seem particularly inclined to brag about it. One can’t help but think that it’s not something that resonates with the Liberal base or his values.

The Liberals, it should further be noted, are prepared to use force when necessary. Chrétien sent the Canadian military to take part in Kosovo War, without the authorization of the United Nations Security Council. Chrétien also deployed the military to Afghanistan in the initial combat mission to defeat the Taliban and Al Qaeda in 2001. Paul Martin later decided to send the military to Kandahar, Afghanistan, the deadliest Canadian mission since Korea. Yet the Liberals have tended to cast these deployments as humanitarian necessities, peace enforcement operations, or in the case of Kandahar, more dangerous than anticipated. The Liberals accept the need to engage in combat, but they still see Canada as a peacenik at heart.

What about the Conservatives? They’re strong supporters of Canada’s military heritage and are more willing to openly commit the armed forces to combat operations. Brian Mulroney’s government deployed the Canadian military to assist with the Persian Gulf War, while Chrétien opposed the decision. In an ode to service traditions, Mulroney also reversed the common military uniform brought in under unification, allowing the Army, Navy, and Air Force to once again have distinct dress. One of Stephen Harper’s first acts as prime minister was to travel to Kandahar to show his support for the troops and their combat mission. Harper also deployed the military as part of the 2011 air campaign against the Libyan regime and he initiated Canada’s contribution against the Islamic State, which included a kinetic role for the CF-18s. In terms of heritage, Harper’s government emphasized the importance of the war of 1812 and Canada’s involvement in the world wars. Harper also re-established the Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Navy, and Royal Canadian Air Force as distinct commands under the National Defence Act.

Both the Mulroney and Harper governments, furthermore, were preoccupied by Canada’s Arctic sovereignty and how to better defend it. To that end, the Mulroney government’s 1987 defence white paper proposed to acquire nuclear-powered submarines that could operate under ice, while the Harper government’s 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy launched the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship project.

Conservatives, however, have struggled with the dollars involved with defence. They laud the military as a national institution and are prepared to use force to defend Canadian interests and values, yet they’re squeamish about how much the armed forces cost. Only a few years after releasing the 1987 defence white paper, the Mulroney government began cutting the defence budget. While the Chrétien era cuts were far deeper, they started under Mulroney.

The Harper government initially planned to spend a good amount on the military, but changed plans after the 2008 economic crisis and a series of procurement headaches. Harper and his close advisors, in fact, grew to distrust the military over the handling of major procurements, such as the Joint Support Ship and the F-35. As one high ranking Conservative told me in the early 2010s: “the military lies all the time.” Even if relations between the Harper Conservatives and the military had been better, it’s unclear if his government would have spent much more on defence. Balancing the budget was a key objective for the Harper Conservatives and defence was expected contribute to that effort.

Pierre Poilievre’s Conservatives appear to be equally focused on budgetary concerns. The Conservatives have been muted about defence issues under his leadership, while economic and fiscal questions have been at the forefront of their communications. Right now, there’s little evidence that a Poilievre government would prioritize higher defence spending over reducing the deficit and debt. In reality, Poilievre government could potentially cut the Liberals’ planning defence increases, or at least slow the rate of growth, in order to curb federal spending. Unless Poilievre is willing to cut social programs or raise taxes, it’s hard to see how the Conservatives would balance the federal budget without demanding sacrifices from the military.

The Conservatives, therefore, are pro-military but reluctant defence spenders. To square this circle, it’s important to remember that, when combined, the defence department and armed forces are the largest part of the federal government. Together, the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces spend the most on procurement, hold the most federal property, have the largest workforce, and have the highest operating cost. Defence spending is also the largest discretionary portion of the federal budget. When Conservatives say they plan to reduce the size of the federal government, they almost always mean the military, too.

This leaves us with the smaller federal parties. Since they haven’t formed government at the federal level, the New Democrats are able to have more cohesive defence policies. They tend to be against combat operations and are skeptical of combat capabilities. The New Democrats would prefer that the military focus on peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance internationally. It’s hard to say what a New Democratic government would do about Canada’s role in NATO and our continental defence partnership with the United States, but it seems unlikely that they’d invest as much as the Liberals or deploy the military as often. The Bloc Québécois, meanwhile, has the easiest time with defence. Does a defence procurement benefit companies in Quebec? If so, the Bloc supports it. If Quebecers oppose an international military deployment, then the Bloc opposes it.

What does all this mean for Canada’s defence debate? Returning to the question of bipartisanship, we can now see why that’s so hard to achieve in Canada. The Liberals want to be the party of peacekeeping, but often end up spending on combat capability and reluctantly deploying the military on combat operations. The Conservatives champion our military heritage and are more determined to use force when necessary, yet they typically balk at the cost of defence and get irked by the bureaucratic games the military plays.

If we took the pro defence spending part of the Liberals and combined it with the principled use of force side of the Conservatives, we might have a bipartisan approach to defence like we see in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. And if we combined the pro peacekeeping side the Liberals with the military spending skepticism of the Conservatives, we’d probably get a New Democrat defence policy. Instead, we have Liberals and Conservative parties that can’t even agree amongst themselves about what to do with the defence file. We can forget about a bipartisan approach until we can arrive at coherent partisan ones.