Canada’s Latest Arctic Pivot

Canada’s allies want us to handle the Arctic. Will we actually prioritize it this time?

Arctic pivots come up often in Canadian defence policy documents. Canada’s 1964 defence white paper, issued by the Pearson government, was heavily tilted toward NATO. When Pierre Trudeau’s government issued its white paper in 1971, Defence in the 70s, it emphasized the importance of defending Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. Nearly two decades later, the Mulroney government’s 1987 white paper had the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines as its centre piece, a capability that would have given Canada an ability to operate year-round in the Arctic. The two white papers that followed under the Chrétien and Martin governments, in 1994 and 2005 respectively, were less focused on the Arctic. Yet the Arctic featured prominently in the Harper government’s 2008 defence policy, the Canada First Defence Strategy. The 2017 white paper, Strong, Secure, Engaged, wasn’t especially Arctic-minded. The newly released defence policy update, on the other hand, Our North, Strong and Free, is big on the Arctic. Of note, this latest policy states:

We must place particular focus on defending the Arctic and North and its approaches against new and accelerating threats through credible deterrence. We will secure our Arctic and North by increasing the presence, reach, mobility and responsiveness of the Canadian Armed Forces in the region, and along our coasts and maritime approaches. We will also develop greater striking power to deter adversaries and keep threats farther from our shores.

Plus ça change, I hear you scoffing. Why should we believe that this latest Arctic pivot will be any different from the last four? There are good reasons to be skeptical. Above all, it’s important to note that, yes, the Arctic features more prominently in the new defence policy update, but it’s on top of Canada’s traditional military priorities, notably NATO. Canada’s current deployment to Latvia, for example, demonstrates that we’re still committed to a frontline role in the collective defence of Europe. Our North, Strong and Free also comes a couple of years after Canada signaled a deeper commitment to the Indo Pacific. So, the Arctic may feature more prominently in Canadian defence, but it’s less of a pivot and more of a form of military multitasking.

There’s another reason to be doubtful about the importance assigned to the Arctic. The capability that would make the most difference for Arctic defence, a new submarine fleet, wasn’t funded under the defence policy update. Instead, Our North, Strong and Free pledges to explore Canada’s submarine options. Were the Arctic truly the priority that it’s said to be, one would have expected the submarine replacement to get the green light as well as some nominal funding.

If we take the Prime Minister at his word, the exploration may involve looking at the feasibility of the nuclear-powered submarines. Certainly, if Canada wanted to join pillar 1 of AUKUS, that would be the way to go. As much as nuclear-powered submarines would make sense from a capability perspective, though, the government will quickly discover that the costs and maintenance of these submarines would be massive. And, frankly, they probably know this already. The more likely reason that new submarines weren’t announced in the defence policy update is because the cost of new diesel-electric submarines, upwards of $100 billion, was considered prohibitive. If diesel-electric submarines are causing heads to explode at the Department of Finance, we can be sure that the exploration of nuclear-powered ones will be perfunctory.

So, the Arctic is nominally a priority. Yet a core capability that would enhance Canada’s surveillance and control in the region has proven too expensive to garner Cabinet approval thus far.

All that said, there’s one factor that may make this Arctic pivot more serious than past ones. The United States has apparently been asking Canada to take on a larger responsibility for the Arctic so that it can focus more resources on the Pacific. Successive American administrations have hoped that Canada would step up in the region, but growing concerns about China have given the request greater importance. In addition, the entry of Sweden and Finland into NATO has strengthened the alliance’s ability to organize a collective approach to the Arctic. Seven of the eight Arctic states are now NATO members, while the eighth, Russia, presents an evident threat to the others. Coupled with the United States nudging us to take a leading role in the region, having Canada at the forefront of a NATO Arctic defence effort would make a good deal of sense. Interestingly, Our North, Strong and Free hints at this possibility.

Unfortunately, Canadian governments are bad at setting priorities and making long term commitments. For Canada to truly pivot its defence efforts toward the Arctic, Ottawa would need to sacrifice other regional ambitions. We don’t spend enough on defence or have a military that’s large enough to do it all. The temptation to juggle multiple priorities and keep our flag flying everywhere it can hasn’t served Canada well since the end of the Cold War, but it’s proven a tough habit to break. Thankfully, Our North, Strong and Free also announced that the government will provide quadrennial defence policy updates. Assuming this pledge holds, we’ll be able to see if this current Arctic focus can hold for at least four years.